Introduction and methodology
In the mid-1870s, Portugal presented the first proposals to build railways in its overseas territories of Africa (Angola and Mozambique), 1 and thus apply in the colonies the development program that it had been implementing in the mainland since the 1850s that privileged transnational rail links from strategic hinterlands to Portuguese harbours. 2 Additionally, it was understood that in order to fulfil this project in Africa, Britain and British capital were privileged partners, given the historical connections between both nations and the geographical proximity of each country's territories in Africa.
3 Until the 1930s, several thousand miles of tracks were built either by private companies or by the State, and added to the Portuguese railway network in the colonies. 4 The investment sought two different goals: to tap into the imagined resources of the colonial hinterlands and to cement the Portuguese presence in territories that were coveted by other, more powerful, European nations. 5 These objectives, however, could clash with the agendas of other countries with similar interests in colonial territories.
Moreover, most of the capital required for such investment came from abroad, which could also be a cause for international divergences. All of this could give rise to conflict situations, sometimes directly (between the nations involved), on other occasions indirectly (through informal agents/go-betweens). 1 These included the lines between Luanda and Ambaca (in Angola) and Lourenço Marques (Delagoa Bay, in Mozambique) and Transvaal (in South Africa). 2 Bruno José Navarro Marçal, "Um império projectado pelo 'silvo da locomotiva'. O papel da engenharia portuguesa na apropriação do espaço colonial africano. Angola e Moçambique (1869-1930)" (PhD diss., Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, 2016), 115 4 Until the 1930s, private companies and the Portuguese State set railroads in the provinces of Benguela, Moçâmedes (Angola), Manica, Sofala, Lourenço Marques, Zambezi, and Moçambique (Mozambique). 5 These two goals met two myths of the Portuguese imagination of the time about Africa (as defined by Portuguese historian, Valentim Alexandre): the myth of Eldorado (the perception that the colonial hinterland was ripe with resources just waiting to be exploited) and the myth of the sacred heritage (the idea that the overseas territories were tokens of the former glory of Portugal and could never be separated from the motherland). See Valentim Alexandre and Jill Dias, "O Império Africano 1825-1890," in Nova História da Expansão Portuguesa, eds. Joel Serrão and A. H. de Oliveira Marques, vol. X (Lisbon: Estampa, 1998), 39-48.
Figure 1 -The Ambaca railway in Angola
Source: sharemap.org and own making 6 The conflicts analysed never escalated to an all-out war. They include those between the Portuguese government and: (1) the Portuguese company of the Luanda-Ambaca railway, and its British bondholders (in Angola); (2) the American contractor of the Delagoa Bay railroad and its British financiers; and (3) the British government and Cecil Rhodes in the context of the adjudication of the Beira railway in the aftermath of the British Ultimatum of 1890 and the subsequent 1891 Treaty. Further details about these historical episodes will be provided in the following sections. process, requiring more than a core of knowledge and a set of tools, that looks for a result that might represent an improvement to the arguing parties, and that leads to a new situation where the opposition between parties is reduced, thanks to a conscious settlement of the issues in dispute. 8 Goncalves identified different stages of that process: beginning of the dispute; early escalation -the issues are not resolved and the conflict increases; deadlock -the opposing sides are unable to reach an understanding; looking for a way out -the parts can no longer tolerate the consequences of the conflict and they try to reach an DOI 10.2478/host-2018-0004 agreement; and working together -to implement that agreement. 9 Depending on the nature and evolution of the conflict some of these stages might be skipped.
The final solution for a conflict might be achieved through negotiation between parties, mediation through a third party, sentence by independent referees in an arbitration process, or plain brute force.
10 Hence, even if there is a solution for a conflict, it does not imply that all parties win or that all parties are happy with the final outcome. In some cases, there might be winners and losers. In the same respect, I do not mean to affirm that all conflicts are solvable. Some might not have a solution, but they can be manageable.
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Determining the nature of the conflict is the first step in the analysis.
12 I argue that the conflicts between Portugal and Britain were set at an international/diplomatic level and were deeply concerned with the control of colonial railways -considering that railways were a powerful tool of imperialism 13 and of territorial appropriation, 14 they could determine who had the practical rule over the disputed territories of Angola and Mozambique.
Therefore, I will use the concept of technodiplomacy and claim that the resolution of the conflict occurred at a technodiplomatic level. Schweitzer originally defined technodiplomacy as "the art and practice of conducting negotiations between countries 9 Goncalves, Conflict Resolution, 66-70. 10 with conflicting technological interests." 15 In a recent study I broadened that definition to "the use of technology to impose such technological interests or an overall national agenda over a foreign country" 16 and indeed, railways in Africa were used to do so (see below). Schweitzer's framework also highlights that in technodiplomacy, negotiations are conducted to avoid hostilities and "in the direction of peace and not war." I also contend that negotiation always sought a peaceful settlement and war was an outcome that was not desired by any of the parties involved. 17 Furthermore, in the analysis of the (techno-)diplomatic intricacies of the negotiations, I
will highlight the role of those non-governmental agents that act unofficially as go-betweens for different governments -or what it is commonly known as track-two diplomacy.
18 In this regard I will also bear in mind to what extent these agents possessed what Lubinski calls the "advantage of outsiderness," which is that feature that allowed historical actors to act as political outsiders in a given context to gain political and economic advantages. 20 Moreover, I maintain that the conflicts between Portugal and Britain were not only financial/resource-based, 21 but were also of an ideological/cultural nature, and they arose from intangible factors, which rendered them more difficult to resolve. 22 Hence, I will take into consideration not only the political/diplomatic international context, 23 but also the cultural background of the relationship between Portugal and Britain in Africa. Several authors have highlighted the importance of these cultural and identity issues in conflict resolution in the past. 24 In the cases at hand, we must bear in mind that conflict resolution processes occurred in the aftermath of two traumatic events for the Portuguese national pride. One was: an ultimatum issued by Britain to Portugal (1890) demanding the removal of Portuguese forces from the areas in Africa between Angola and Mozambique -a diplomatic event that in Portugal reinforced the nationalistic feeling towards the colonies and the overall Portuguese identity; the second trauma was the declaration of a partial default of the Portuguese exchequer in 1892.
colonization, also possessed a relevant cultural value and were powerful instruments to impose metropolitan national identities in the African colonies. Many studies have underlined the cultural importance of technology and its decisive role in the construction of national identities. 25 In the same respect, different researchers have also stressed the relevance of the railroad for the construction of identities in sundry contexts. In England, Philip Paynton showed how the railway contributed to the construction of the identity of the rural Englishness. 26 In Switzerland, the Saint Gotthard tunnel, inaugurated in 1882, was, for generations, "a symbol of the country's independence, defiant and able to defend itself." 27 Moving to the colonial context, railroads and railway stations acted as instruments of power, pride, and Europeanization of the overseas territories. 28 Jeremy Foster, in a study about South Africa, also highlights the power of railways (amidst other tools of so-called modernity) to transform and build "the imaginary space of the nation."
29 Hence, any dispute regarding railways in Africa also involved cultural and identity issues, which, as far as the wrangles were concerned, "simply added fuel to the fire."
30
To analyse these issues, I propose a rather simple and straightforward framework, 25 were always reasons for friction between Portugal and Britain.
44
The inception of the conflict(s)
In the Angolan railway case, financial issues were at the base of the conflict. However, considering the technodiplomatic relevance and the symbolism of the railroad, soon the conflict took broader proportions.
Companhia Real Através de África raised the capital necessary for construction and operation of the line by issuing £800,000 in stocks and £1,890,000 in bonds. 45 The situation was not uncommon. Usually railway companies preferred raising capital with bonds rather than with stocks. 46 Nonetheless, the way Companhia Real's bonds were issued raised problems. Whereas the majority of stock capital was with Portuguese investors (associated with the company's board), bonds were issued solely in London, with the intercession of one Count Oksza. 47 The management of the bonds was entrusted to a committee of trustees. In the loan agreement with the trustees, the company gave the track as collateral; in other words the loan was based on mortgage bonds. 48 This was usual in Britain, but completely illegal according to Portuguese law: 44 Marçal, "Um império projectado pelo 'silvo da locomotiva'," 330-342. 45 This would not be a problem if the railway was financially viable and interest was duly paid to bondholders. However, the construction of the track (1889-1899) cost more than anticipated and the operation of the track was unprofitable.
Chart 1 -Net results of Companhia Real Através de África, in contos
(1 conto = 1,000,000 reais ≈ £222).
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According to the terms of the concession, the government covered the losses and paid a guarantee of yield to the company. 52 This was not enough to pay the bondholders' 49 Pereira, "A política ferroviária nacional," 329. 50 Marçal, "Um império projectado pelo 'silvo da locomotiva'," 245. In any case, all parties had reasons for concern. British investors were on the brink of not getting their money's worth; the Portuguese company was facing bankruptcy; the government in Lisbon was being threatened by a process that might end in losing to British interests a powerful political, economic, and colonizing tool, especially in a strategic and coveted area of Africa. So, although the conflict was apparently between two private parties, the company and the trustees, it did actually involve indirectly the interests of Portugal and Britain, given the technodiplomatic and symbolic importance of the Ambaca railway in Angola. Albeit the government stated that it could do nothing regarding a foreign railway, it was clear that its control was an important matter (and desire) within British political circles. 61 On 25 June 1889, Portugal decided to rescind the contract with McMurdo, arguing that he had failed to meet the deadline for construction. 62 Although the contract stipulated that in such circumstances the line should be auctioned and re-leased to the highest bidder, the Portuguese government ignored that obligation. Fearing that McMurdo might make a bid and get the line back, it took immediate possession of the works. 63 In Britain, the decision was considered "a deed to which the modern history of civilised governments affords no parallel" and its only motivation "the desire on the 65 There were breaches of contract from both sides of the agreement. McMurdo had indeed failed to meet the deadline and he had transferred the concession to the new company without authorisation from the Portuguese government. However, Portugal did not state clearly the ending point of the line (it was in the border with the Transvaal, a matter that was under negotiation with the Boer republic) and it had previously conceded a tramway parallel to the railway from Delagoa Bay to Transvaal, which violated the monopoly of rail transport granted to McMurdo in the terms of the contract. 67 The dispute, which originally was resource-based, soon acquired political and technodiplomatic elements, especially as far as Britain was concerned, considering the relevance of the Lourenço Marques railway to its agenda for South Africa. and the railway structures were set was British territory. 70 Englishness did not just prevail during construction. After the line was opened, rules, regulations, and orders were issued in English; the fares were substantially higher than those permitted by the terms of the concession; even the lands neighbouring the line belonged mostly to British citizens; 71 and the figures of the operation (revenues, costs, passengers and goods carried) were not disclosed to the Portuguese authorities. A Portuguese officer stationed in Manica, Aires de Ornelas, considered the whole situation sombre. In a report to the government, he concluded that the territory was Portuguese in name only and foresaw that it would be tremendously difficult to change that.
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Although the construction had cost Portugal nothing (it had even received a small share of stock capital in the Beira Railway Company), and the operation was smooth and was helping the revival of the harbour in Beira (see Chart 2 below), the railway was contributing to a de-nationalization of the region from its original "rulers," the Portuguese chartered Companhia de Moçambique. In this context, it was natural that the Companhia de Moçambique desired stronger control over the line in order to limit British South Africa Company ambitions and at the same time serve the Portuguese agenda for the region. 70 Marçal, "Um império projectado pelo 'silvo da locomotiva'," 320-336. In 1896, general-manager of Companhia de Moçambique, Fontes Pereira de Melo Ganhado, wrote a pleading letter to the government. He claimed that the railway company acted as it pleased, without providing any information to the Portuguese chartered company. Its engineers treated Chimoio (a town in Portuguese territory) as if it were "as British as Umtali [now Mutare]." In sum, it was as if the railway "was being built in a far and away country, instead of being built in the most surveyed region of the Portuguese territory. 
Negotiating a solution
The three situations of conflict over nominally Portuguese railways in colonial southern Africa had distinct origins, natures, and features. Some escalated quickly (the case of the Lourenço Marques railway), others lingered for years before arriving at a deadlock when an understanding was impossible. Therefore, the contours of the subsequent discussions also presented different characteristics. However, there was one important detail in common to the discussions and disputes: all occurred in the 1890s and early
1900s, a particularly difficult period in Portuguese history.
As mentioned before, the British ultimatum of 1890 was a humiliating event for
Portuguese society. It strengthened nationalistic feeling about the colonies and the antagonism towards the British. Thereafter, they were represented as spoilers of valuable territories of the Portuguese Empire and blamed for a situation that dishonoured Portugal. 74 Demonizing and blaming opposing parties is common in conflicts, 75 particularly those that include identity issues, 76 which can, in the end, strengthen the cohesion of the groups in dispute. 77 Besides the political challenges created by the ultimatum, Portugal also faced financial difficulties in the 1890s. In 1892, after the government declared a partial default, it abandoned the gold-standard, and struggled to access external financial markets.
Settlement with creditors was only agreed upon in 1906. 78 Albeit indirectly, this climate of financial uncertainty affected the negotiating processes -financial markets have a bearing on conflict resolution. 79 Besides, it is well known that during negotiations one party is aware of how much the resolution of the conflict will cost its opponent(s). 80 Considering that the conflicts were also resource-based, these financial challenges left Portugal with little margin for manoeuver.
*
Negotiations regarding the Ambaca railway were held mainly between the Portuguese company and the Portuguese government, but the looming presence of the bondholders' trustees, and subsequently the British government, and their claim over the property of the line, although illegal, was a constant threat. Thus, the option of just letting the DOI 10.2478/host-2018-0004 company go bankrupt, although seductive, was very risky. 81 The conflict was under control as long as the bondholders got their biannual payments in due time. So that became the main goal of the Portuguese government, which always fulfilled the terms of its contract with Companhia Real: the operation losses were covered, and the guarantee of yield duly paid. 82 However, the amount due to the bondholders was superior to the subsidy paid by the State. The situation worsened after the 1891 default, as the interest had to be paid in pounds sterling, but the guarantee of yield was paid in the devalued Portuguese currency (reais/contos). Companhia Real blamed the State for its situation, arguing that it had suffered severely with the default and claiming that the government should pay the subsidy in sterling (thus covering the losses in the exchange rate). Furthermore, it claimed that the State had not built any roads in Angola, which were to feed the railway with traffic.
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In the meantime, different private investors (British, but also German, Dutch, Belgian, and French) observed the situation, hoping to eventually control the railway. In 1898 and 1899, it became known that Germany and Britain were negotiating the division of the colonial territories of bankrupt Portugal. 84 The company itself used this alleged foreign interest as leverage in the negotiations with the government: in 1911 the board informed the government that it had refused to sell stock to foreign investors out of pure patriotism. 85 The hint was clear, though. If the government failed to consider the company's needs, the board might decide to sell it to foreign capital. 81 Previous experiences in the Portuguese mainland railways leased to private companies had taught the same lesson. A railway company funded by British or French capital was just too big to fail, in yet another case of private enterprise running on public risk -Daniel Thorner Therefore, the Portuguese State gave additional sundry benefits to the railway company:
prorogating the deadline for construction, paying the subsidy in advance, acting as guarantor for the company's loans, allowing increases in fares, 86 and building the extension of the line to the rubber-producing region of Malange. 87 These constituted a substantial financial effort for the Portuguese Treasury. The alternative of not granting them would mean the default of the company, the complaint of the trustees, and an intervention by the British government, and likely loss of control of the railway to foreign interests.
Additionally, the government appointed an official representative (José de Almada) to meet directly with the trustees in order to alter the terms of the contract, annulling the mortgage of the railway and granting a State guarantee to pay the bonds' interest.
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Nothing came out of these talks, as the trustees held the upper hand and they did not need to change the terms of the loan contract. In this process, Portugal followed a negotiation style between compromise (proposing a series of trade-offs) and collaboration (pooling individual needs and goals towards a common objective).
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Nonetheless, since the company always paid its due, there were never grounds for a hostile takeover by foreign interests. Regardless, the situation was a powder keg just waiting to explode. Some proposed that the State should cease its aid to the company and simply let it go bankrupt. Others preferred nationalisation of the company. It was argued that with the line under full State control, it would be far from the grasp of foreign interests and would promote Portugal's colonising goals.
90
Nationalising Companhia Real was not an easy task, however, because the company also blamed the State for its situation and demanded greater compensation than the State was willing to pay. Notwithstanding, Portugal managed to cope with the claims 86 Marçal, "Um império projectado pelo 'silvo da locomotiva'," 247. 87 Portugal, Direcção dos Caminhos de Ferro de Luanda, Monographia do caminho de ferro de Malange (Luanda: Imprensa Nacional, 1909). 88 Caminho de ferro de Ambaca, room S12, module E14, shelf P02, number 75456, process 32, Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático. 89 For styles of negotiation, see Goncalves, Conflict Resolution, 48-52. 90 Marçal, "Um império projectado pelo 'silvo da locomotiva'," 256. Later, it offered to reimburse investors the money they had invested. 93 The ultimate goal, however, was to keep the railway under full State control, so that the government could use it to impose the Portuguese agenda on Lourenço Marques, free from any external influence. Indeed, shortly after the confiscation of the line, Portugal agreed with the Transvaal a through-traffic agreement for goods transported from Lourenço Marques to Pretoria. 94 Neither the British nor the Americans accepted the offer, as they demanded not only their money back, but also compensation for the future profits they were prevented from receiving. Their respective governments heeded their complaints: London and Washington informed Lisbon that its original offer was unacceptable. 91 Marçal, "Um império projectado pelo 'silvo da locomotiva'," 260-268. 92 The Railway Times 56/23/2709 (7 December 1889): 699. 93 In parliament, minister of Foreign Affairs, Hintze Ribeiro, stated that Portugal did not seek to profit from somebody else's effort. The government was willing to compensate the investors in "fair terms." Diario da Câmara dos Deputados 21 July 1890: 704. 94 Correspondence. Delagoa Delagoa Bay Railway; setting up of an Arbitration Tribunal, letter 6 September 1889, DO 119/141, TNA. DOI 10.2478/host-2018-0004 since 1887; the harbour of Lourenço Marques was the natural outlet of Transvaal; the railway was the quicker route from the Transvaal gold fields to Lourenço Marques; probable annual net profit of the railway oscillated between 25% and 50% of the cost of construction. 101 Portuguese engineers in Lisbon countered the opinions of their British colleagues, arguing that they were exaggerated and lacked any justification. However, none of those technicians had experience in Africa. 102 The Swiss tribunal also sent to South Africa three experts, Stockalper, Dietler, and Nicole, who estimated the cost of the railway as £255,000 and its overall value £1,820,000. 103 The figure was far from the £3,245,000 demanded by the Americans and British. In 1900, ten years after the arbitration started, the tribunal decided that Portugal had to pay roughly £950,000 to the British and American creditors. 104 Trehane, the American representative, was appalled -he could not find the words "to speak in too strong terms of reprobation of the dilatory, careless, and slovenly manner in which the Tribunal has done its work." 105 The British were more acquiescent, as they realised that the shady dealings of McMurdo had weighed in the final decision. Also, on the brink of war with the Transvaal, the British had got from Portugal the commitment of not transporting weapons and ammunition to the Boer republic. 106 After the war and the British annexation of the Transvaal, the railway fostered a symbiosis between both colonies' economies, as it conveyed Transvaal DOI 10.2478/host-2018-0004
Companhia de Moçambique, Mr. Ganhado, asked the Portuguese government to intervene and force the railway companies to submit to some control to the Portuguese chartered company, with no practical results. He regretted he got no help at all from the Portuguese ambassador in London. 110 The railway companies (Beira Railway and Beira Junction), however, were happy with this state of affairs, whereas Portuguese authorities in Lisbon preferred to avoid worsening the conflict. Their reasons were that: (1) the working of the line was contributing to the development of the harbour in Beira; 111 (2) the enterprise had cost Portugal nothing and it was the only one in the entire Empire that was not draining money from the Portuguese Treasury; 112 (3) Portugal was already handling two conflicts with Britain, so that creating a new one in Beira would just add fuel to the difficult technodiplomatic relation between both nations; and (4) the government had already obtained from Britain the acknowledgment that with the railway Portugal had met all the conditions imposed in the 1891 Treaty. 113 This was a situation where direct communication between governments was not worthwhile, and it was advisable that negotiations resumed with track-two agents.
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The policy of avoiding conflict in Beira is clear in the following detail: as usual, both Beira Railway and Beira Junction used bonds to raise the capital necessary for the undertaking. Both gave as collateral the line itself, but in neither case did Portugal 110 In 1896, Ganhado claimed he had written 41 letters to the government since 1891. oppose or complain. 115 Even in the Portuguese parliament -where debates about railways and foreign intervention were usually long and vivid 116 -the Beiragate was timidly discussed: between 1896 and 1899 there were only seven meetings between government and opposition that, furthermore, ended quite briefly. However, nothing would come out of this contract in the following years. 118 From 1897 onwards, rumours circulated that the railway companies were negotiating the lease of the lines to the firm that operated railroads in Rhodesia (Mashonaland Railway Company, also controlled by British South African Company). 119 In August 1900, the railway companies informed Companhia de Moçambique that the lease was complete. Once again, the board of the Portuguese chartered company was baffled and kept aside from negotiations. 120 One year later, the lease agreement was presented to Companhia de Moçambique. Officers at the Portuguese Ministry of Marine and Overseas suggested the new contract was acceptable as it stipulated a decrease in fares and also broader supervision powers by the Portuguese chartered company; additional alterations to the contract should be kept to a minimum, considering the difficulty of DOI 10.2478/host-2018-0004 negotiating with the railway companies.
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In the next few years, the feud followed mostly economic and business contours, involving fares and the development of the harbour in Beira, in order to attract a large chunk of Rhodesian traffic. In 1906-1907 a new agreement was reached between the Portuguese chartered company and the companies that operated the Beira railway. It stipulated a decrease in fares and the construction of a new dock in Beira, 122 which then led to an increase in traffic towards Beira (see chart 2). 123 As in Lourenço Marques, economic development in the aftermath of the negotiation helped to settle the dispute.
But in this case, track-two action also created an ambiance for a more peaceful settlement and a more stable aftermath.
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In the end, Portugal was not able to eliminate the British presence and pre-eminence in the railway and in Manica -which led to a new, unsuccessful attempt to attract Belgian capital to build the railway from Beira to the Zambezi River. 125 However, the railway became responsible for the increase of movement in Beira. Portugal could thus prove to Europe that it was indeed working to colonise, "civilise," and bring "progress" to that area of Africa and thus could still be considered a colonial nation.
Conflict outcomes
The three conflict cases had different natures, but they cannot be separated from the context of the scramble for Africa in the 1880s and the specificity of the 1890s in the 121 Caminho-de-ferro da Beira. 1895, 1901, 1903, 1905 125 Which, in the end, was built by British capital. Marçal, "Um império projectado pelo 'silvo da locomotiva'," 359-362. Colonial Railways and Conflict Resolution history of Portugal. Also, they illustrate the importance of technology as a "tool of empire" to assert dominance in the colonial landscapes but also the importance of money in the implementation, development (and failure) of technical systems.
Within these contexts, it is clear that despite the graveness of the situation, its settling was not urgent. All three disputes took years to resolve. Evidently, the parties could tolerate a longer situation of conflict, especially in Ambaca (where the conflict was controlled as long as the trustees were paid their due).
Second, throughout these processes, the agency of track-two diplomats was vital during negotiation and settlement. This confirms that track-two diplomacy is not a surrogate for track-one diplomacy, but a supplement. 126 Their action was visible in the case of the Ambaca and Beira lines, particularly in the latter. In Lourenço Marques, the question was handled directly at a governmental level. Fourth, even though the ultimate goals of Portugal and Britain were not achieved (as they were quite opposing), the final results of the negotiations led to a situation where both countries' agendas were favoured. Portugal did not lose complete control of the railways, which were used to foster its colonial economies and to assert the Portuguese presence in Africa. Britain, on the other hand, kept a presence in the Portuguese colonies, exerting a form of informal imperialism. The three conflicts did not lead to a final situation of frustration or violence, but they did not foster development and dynamism 127 in the relationship between Portugal and Britain in Africa. Rather, they
